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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Max Ritchie Cooke is presently serving sentences for second degree kidnapping,
aggravated battery, and assault. In 2004, Mr. Cooke initiated a post-conviction case
through which he has raised collateral challenges to the convictions and sentences in
his underlying criminal case.
Ultimately, Mr. Cooke's amended petition for post-conviction relief was summarily
dismissed by the district court. Mr. Cooke now appeals the district court's order of
summary dismissal, contending that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on each of
the four claims for relief asserted in his amended petition.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2003, Max Ritchie Cooke was convicted of one count of second degree
kidnapping, one count of aggravated battery, and one count of assault, and received
three concurrent prison sentences. (R., pp.11-12; 48.) He remains in the custody of the
Idaho Department of Correction. (R., pp. II; 48.)
On October 5, 2004, Mr. Cooke filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
and an attached affidavit of supporting facts.

(R., pp.11-20.) The State filed two

responsive memoranda, one on November 12, 2004, and one on January 28, 2005.
(R., pp.34-38; 39-42.)

On April 6, 2005, the district court issued an order purporting to dismiss
Mr. Cooke's petition, but at the same time allowing Mr. Cooke approximately 60 days to
file an amended petition.' (R., pp.45-46.)
On June 6, 2005, Mr. Cooke, this time through counsel, filed a verified Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (R., pp.47-52.) In his amended petition, Mr. Cooke
asserted four claims for relief:
1)

There is new evidence, not previously presented, which requires vacation
of Mr. Cooke's conviction. Specifically, there is previously-unpresented
evidence indicating that one of the State's key witnesses, the victim of
Mr. Cooke's alleged crimes, Alison Cooke, was not competent to have
testified at Mr. Cooke's trial due to memory losses suffered as a result of
head injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

2)

Mr. Cooke's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a) procure the
services of a medical expert who could have testified as to Ms. Cooke's
incompetence or, at least, impeached her testimony with evidence that
she was at substantial risk for having false memories; and (b) adequately
cross-examining Ms. Cooke regarding her memory loss.

3)

Mr. Cooke's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of
appeal as requested by Mr. Cooke.

4)

Mr. Cooke was prevented from timely filing a pro se notice of appeal when
the prison paralegal misadvised Mr. Cooke as to his filing deadline and
refused to notarize or mail Mr. Cooke's notice of appeal?

--

' It is Mr. Cooke's position that the district court's order, because it specifically contemplated the

continuation of the same case, was more akin to a notice of intent to dismiss than an actual order of
dismissal. (See R., p.45.)
* Mr. Cooke apparently abandoned a number of claims, originally made in his initial petition and affidavit,
regarding his trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. (Compare R., pp. 16-19 (original affidavit
alleging ineffectiveness for failing to: (a) hire an investigator andlor accident reconstructionist; (b) call
certain witnesses; (c) communicate with Mr. Cooke or provide Mr. Cooke with discovery materials; and (d)
correct certain errors in the presentence investigation report) with 47-52 (amended petition asserting only
the above-identified claims).) Nevertheless, the claim regarding trial counsel's alleged failure to hire an
investigator was argued by the parties and ruled upon by the district court. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.2, Ls.13-15
(Mr. Bourne's assertion that "I think there is a claim that he failed to hire an accident reconstructionist"),
p.10, L.9 - p.11, L.19 (colloquy between district court and Mr. Cooke's counsel regarding the accident
reconstruction report that was actually used at Mr. Cooke's trial), p.12, L.8 - p.14, L.10 (identifying district
court's concern that it could not know if the reconstruction report used at trial was inaccurate since
Mr. Cooke had failed to obtain a second report in conjunction with his post-conviction case); p.16, L.22
p.17, L.6 (apparently ruling on claim relating to accident reconstructionist); R., p.86 (denying claim
relating to accident reconstructionist because "[tlhe Court finds that the petitioner has failed to carry his

-

(See R., pp.47-52.) Mr. Cooke attached to his amended petition four affidavits. (See
generally R., pp.54-61 (affidavit of Allison Cooke, attaching documents, including a
medical report detailing her head injuries and the impact those injuries had on her
memory and mental functioning generallyI3 as well as a letter describing the motor
vehicle accident which caused those injuries, asserting that, because of her memory
problems, she was not competent when she testified at Mr. Cooke's trial), 62-63
(affidavit of Mr. Cooke detailing his conversations with the prison paralegal, and
asserting that she refused to notarize his notice of appeal), 64-65 (affidavit of Mr. Cooke
detailing his conversations with his trial counsel, and asserting that immediately after
being sentenced he specifically requested that a notice of appeal be filed), 66-69
(affidavit of Timothy D. McMillin).)
On July 1, 2005, the State filed a joint response/motion for summary dismissal.
(R., pp.71-74.) With regard to Mr. Cooke's two claims relating to Ms. Cook's memory
loss, the State asserted that: (a) Ms. Cooke was, in fact, competent and reliable to
testify at Mr. Cooke's trial;4 (b) because they were not contemporaneous with
Ms. Cooke's trial testimony, the medical report attached to her affidavit, the letter
burden to prove that trial counsel was ineffective" for failing to hire an independent accident
reconstructionist).)
Notwithstanding the fact that this particular claim was apparently tried by consent of the parties, see
I.R.C.P. 15(b), Mr. Cooke does not now appeal the summary dismissal of that claim. He concedes that
because he only alleged that, "[tlo the best of [his] knowledge" his trial counsel failed to hire an accident
reconstructionst (as opposed to a more affirmative statement of fact) (R., p.16), he has failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact. However, this allegation is interesting since it makes it clear that
Mr. Cooke was not kept abreast of the status of his case.
That medical report states that Ms. Cooke had received "a severe traumatic brain injury," that she was
"disoriented and easily confused," that, "[slhe was not oriented to city, month, day of the month, or year,"
that she could not perform simple multiplication, that, "[slhe still appears to be in posttraumatic amnesia
and has severe deficits with memory," that her "[rleasoning is ... still in the severe range of impairment,"
that she "is still demonstrating very severe problems with confusion, disorientation and severe memory
impairment," that she is not "competent or even appropriate for a police or forensic evaluation or interview
at this time," and that "her information will likely be misleading, unreliable, and she is at risk for developing
new memories or false memories rather than accurately recalling what happened ..." (R., pp.59-60.)

attached to her affidavit, and the affidavit itself, are not relevant to Ms. Cooke's ability to
accurately remember anything at the time she testified; and (c) as far as counsel for the
State can personally recall, Ms. Cooke's letter and affidavit are consistent with her trial
testimony and Ms. Cooke testified that she could remember some facts, but could not
remember

other^.^

(R., pp.72-73.) With regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel for his attorney's failure to timely file a notice of appeal, the State,
relying on an affidavit from Mr. Cooke's trial attorney, refuted Mr. Cook's
characterization of the facts and claimed that Mr. Cooke's request for an appeal was
made after the 42-day time limit for filing an appeal. (R., pp.73-74; 77-78.) Finally, with
regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of denial of access to the courts, the State, relying on an
affidavit from Janel Gardner, the prison paralegal, again refuted Mr. Cook's
characterization of the facts and claimed that the prison paralegal did not misadvise Mr.
Cooke regarding his time limit for filing a notice of appeal. (R., p.74; Affidavit of Janel
Gardner, pp.l-2.)6 The State did not directly dispute, however, Mr. Cooke's contention
that the paralegal had refused to notarize and mail his notice of appeal. (See Affidavit
of Janel Gardner, pp.1-2.)'

The State offered no evidentiary support for this contention.
Because these allegations of fact by Roger Bourne, the prosecutor who evidently called Ms. Cooke to
testify against Mr. Cooke, and who also drafted the State's motion for summary dismissal, are not
supported by any evidence, such as an affidavit signed by Mr. Bourne, they are not evidence. Meckling
v. Fontes, 125 Idaho 689,693, 873 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Ct. App. 1994).
Ms. Gardner's affidavit is attached to a Motion to Augment Record, which is filed contemporaneously
herewith.
The paralegal's affidavit admits that she does sometimes "turn inmates away" if they have not scheduled
an appointment or if their papetwork is not complete, but it does not state whether she, in fact, turned
Mr. Cooke away and, if so, specifically why she did so. (See Affidavit of Janel Gardner, p.2.)

'

On September 28, 2005, the district court held a hearing on the State's motion
for summary dismissal.

(See generally R., pp.83-84; Tr. Vol. 11.)~ With regard to

Mr. Cooke's two claims relating to Ms. Cooke's memory loss, Mr. Bourne, arguing for
summary dismissal: (a) urged the district court to remember Ms. Cooke's testimony, and
to find that Ms. Cooke was, in fact, competent when she gave that testimony (Tr. Vol. II,
p.3, Ls.8-19); (b) offered his opinion that the jury rendered the verdicts that it did
because it discounted Ms. Cooke's testimony to a certain degree, thereby indicating,
perhaps, that Ms. Cooke was adequately impeached (See Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.4, L.4); (c)
argued that, "the petitioner hasn't carried his burden of proving that there was more that
could have been done to cross-examine Allison Cooke about the state of her memoryn
(Tr., p.4, Ls.5-8 (emphasis added)).
With regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for his
attorney's failure to timely file a notice of appeal, Mr. Bourne argued that Mr. Cooke's
trial counsel's affidavit was more persuasive than Mr. Cooke's own sworn statements
(Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.15 because it was corroborated by the prison paralegal's affida~it.~
p.5, L.9.) He also argued that, assuming Mr. Cooke's counsel had rendered deficient
performance by failing to timely file a notice of appeal, Mr. Cooke could not demonstrate
any prejudice because he failed to identify what issue might have been appealed and
he failed prove that he would have been successful on appeal. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.10 There are two separately-bound transcripts in the record in this case. The transcript of an August 16,
2005, hearing is referenced herein as "Tr. Vol. I," and the transcript of the September 28, 2005, hearing is
referenced as "Tr. Vol. 11."
It is notable that in arguing that the two affidavits (both of which appear to have been drafted by
Mr. Bourne himself) corroborate one another, Mr. Bourne discussed his "recollection" of facts which don't
appear in either affidavit. (Compare Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.18 - p.5, L.l (arguing that the paralegal had records
showing that Mr. Cooke made certain requests on certain dates and that these dates were consistent with
Mr. Cooke's trial attorney's records) with R., pp.76-78 (trial counsel's affidavit, which vaguely asserts that

p.6, L.2.) Finally, with regard to Mr. Cooke's claim of denial of access to the courts,
Mr. Bourne argued implicitly that the prison paralegal's affidavit was more persuasive
than Mr. Cooke's own sworn statements (See Tr. Vol. Ill p.4, L.17

- p.5,

L.l) and

expressed his opinion of what the true facts are: "I think that the defendant went there
[to the prison paralegal] late then asked her to file certain things or mail certain things to
the attorney, which she did and it-and

it was too late." (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.2-5.)

After Mr. Bourne concluded his remarks, Mr. Cooke's counsel presented
arguments in opposition to summary dismissal and fielded numerous questions posed
by the district court. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.8

- p.15,

L.5.)

During that

colloquy, the district court made it clear that, based on its memory of Mr. Cooke's
underlying criminal case, it disagreed with Mr. Cooke's counsel's characterization of the
letter attached to Ms. Cooke's affidavit:
THE COURT: She never testified to that at the trial. She didn't testify as
to whether or not this was an accident, a true accident. The evidence that
came out at the trial was is [sic] that, from the investigation, it was
apparent to those that investigated this case that Mr. Ritchie [sic], after the
vehicle left the road, accelerated. He did not decelerate. There was no
braking. It was acceleration demonstrated through that field. So,
Ms. Cooke did not testify to that.''
(Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.9-17.) Ultimately, the district court granted the State's motion for
summary dismissal. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 16, L.6 - p.18, L.3.) The district court based its grant
of summary dismissal upon two conclusions. First, it found that Mr. Cooke failed to
show that Ms. Cooke was incompetent when she testified because "[tlhe court can
Mr. Cooke did not request an appeal until after the 42-day time limit had run) and Affidavit of Janel
Gardner (saying nothing about the dates when any interactions with Mr. Cooke had occurred).)
lo
Interestingly, the district court's recollection of the underlying criminal case differs markedly from Mr.
Bourne's recollection of that case (R., p.73 ("The undersigned's recollection of her testimony is that her
letter and affidavit are generally consistent with her testimony.").) Moreover, it demonstrates precisely
why Mr. Cooke should receive a new trial: because Ms. Cooke's testimony, which the State used against

certainly take notice of the fact that she--during the course of her direct as well as
cross-examination, she was oriented as to time, date, and place. She was responsive
to the questions before her. She readily admitted that she had memory lapses during
that process."

(Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.11-18.) Second, it concluded that the outcome of

Mr. Cooke's case would not have been different if he had appealed his conviction.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.7-23.)
On October 6, 2005, the district court entered an order memorializing and adding
further detail to its grant of the State's motion for summary disposition."

(See generally

R., pp.85-88.) With regard to Ms. Cooke's trial testimony (which, of course, relates to
the first and second claims in Mr. Cooke's amended petition), the district court
summarily rejected Ms. Cooke's sworn statement in which she asserted that her
memory was not intact, and that she did not know what was going on, when she
testified at Mr. Cooke's trial. (R., p.86.) It apparently did so based on its memory of
Ms. Cooke's trial testimony and its belief, based upon that recollection, that Ms. Cooke
was lucid when she testified: "The Court takes notice that when Ms. Cooke testified,
she was oriented as to time and place and was able to testify that she remembered

Mr. Cooke, was markedly different from the facts that Ms. Cooke recalls now that she has more fully
recovered from her brain injuries.
l1As was set forth in some detail in Mr. Cooke's Motion to Remand Case, filed with this Court on August
I,
2006, it is Mr. Cooke's contention that the district court's October 6, 2005 order looks more like a notice
of intent to dismiss than an actual order of dismissal because it allowed Mr. Cooke twenty days in which
to file an second amended petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.88.) However, this Court determined
that that order is, in fact, a final appealable order. (Order Denying Motion to Remand Case (Sept. 13,
2006).)
This Court's Order Denying Motion to Remand Case holds that, "the Order Dismissing Petition
Petition for Post Conviction Relief filed with this Court November 7, 2005, is final." (Order Denying Motion
to Remand Case, p.1.) Undersigned counsel presumes that the November 7, 2005, order in question is
the same order that the district court issued on October 6, 2005, since the district court has informed
undersigned counsel that the October 6, 2005, order was the last document filed in Mr. Cooke's case in
the district court, and this Court has provided undersigned counsel with a copy of the October 6, 2005,
order which also bears a file stamp from this Court indicating that it was received on November 7, 2005.

certain things and did not remember others. She was responsive to questions and was
appropriate in every respect. The jury was informed through her testimony that she had
some memory lapses." (R., p.86.)

The district court also discounted the medical

evidence related to Ms. Cooke's brain injury because that injury and the subsequent
medical report preceded Ms. Cooke's trial testimony by five months.

(R., p.86.)

Ultimately, the district court ruled that Mr. Cooke's claims failed because he failed to
prove that Ms. Cooke was incompetent: "The Court is satisfied that Ms. Cooke was
competent to testify. The petitioner has not carried his burden to show that trial counsel
was ineffective in any respect regarding Ms. Cooke." (R., p.86.)
With regard to Mr. Cooke's trial attorney's failure to timely file a notice of appeal
on Mr. Cooke's behalf (which relates to the third claim in Mr. Cooke's amended
petition), the district court, after reviewing the evidence proffered by both parties, chose
to believe the State's evidence over that which was offered by Mr. Cooke: "After a
review of the affidavit of trial counsel and of the. prison paralegal, the Court finds that the
petitioner did not ask trial counsel to file an appeal until after the appeal time had run."
(R., p.87.) The district court also ruled, alternatively, that Mr. Cooke could not prevail as
a matter of law because, even if Mr. Cooke's trial counsel had timely been asked to file
a notice of appeal, Mr. Cooke failed to even allege prejudice from trial counsel's failure
to do so because Mr. Cooke did not point out what issue might have been appealed,
much less did he prove that he could have won on appeal:
Further, the Court finds that the petitioner has not shown that there was
any appealable issue. The Court is satisfied that the verdict and the
sentence are fully supported by the record. The Court knows of no
appealable issue which would likely have been settled in the petitioner's
favor. The Court finds that the petitioner has not shown ineffective

assistance of counsel regarding the appeal and has not shown prejudice
to himself from the lack of an appeal.
(R., p.87.)
In its October 6, 2005, order summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's amended
petition, the district court did not even address Mr. Cooke's fourth claim in his amended
petition-that

he had been denied access to the courts when the prison paralegal

refused to notarize Mr. Cooke's notice of appeal. (See generally R., pp.85-88.) Rather,
after discussing Mr. Cooke's third claim, the district court concluded by dismissing
Mr. Cooke's amended petition entirely: "[Tlhe State's Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Petition is granted and the Amended Petition is dismissed. The petitioner has twenty
days from September 28, 2005, to file an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief."
(R., pp.87-88.)
Instead of filing a second amended petition for post-conviction relief, on
October 27, 2005, Mr. Cooke filed a Notice of Appeal.

(R., pp.89-91.)

On appeal,

Mr. Cooke contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his amended
petition for post-conviction relief, and he requests that the order of dismissal be vacated
and his case remanded for an evidentiary hearing on each of his four claims.

I
ISSUE
Did the district err in summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's amended petition for postconviction relief?

I
I
I
I

I

I
I
I

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred In Summarilv Dismissing Mr. Cooke's Amended Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief

A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying
criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 ldaho 454,
456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act (hereinaffer, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to -4911) and the
ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 ldaho at 456, 808 P.2d at 375.
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction petitions where there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. I.C. 3 19-4906(c).I2 In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard,
the district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez,
126 ldaho at 816-817, 892 P.2d at 491-492. However, if the petitioner presents some
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the
petitioner's allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the
State. Tramel v. State, 92 ldaho 643, 646, 448 P.2d 649, 652 (1968). This is so even if
the allegations appear incredible on their face.

Id.

Thus, only after the State

controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the evidence.
Drapeau v. State, 103 ldaho 612, 651 P.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must
l2Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(c), which deals with motions for summary
disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g., Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971
P.2d at 1155 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under section 19-4906 generally as being
whether a genuine issue of material fact has been presented).

still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner,
Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. The district court need not accept those of
the petitioner's allegations which are "clearly disproved by the record." Coontz v. State,
129 ldaho 360,368,924 P.2d 622,630 (Ct. App. 1996).
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155.
If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 194906(b), (c).
In this case, Mr. Cooke asserts that he has presented sufficient evidence to raise
a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the four claims raised in his amended
petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that the district court, therefore, erred in
summarily dismissing his amended petition, and he requests that the district court's
order of dismissal be vacated, and that his case be remanded for an evidentiary
hearing.
A.

Mr. Cooke Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact Reqardinq Ms. Cooke's
Competence To Testifv At Trial And, Thus, Is Entitled To An Evidentiarv Hearinq
On Both Claims That Relate To That lssue
The first two claims raised in Mr. Cooke's amended petition (new evidence and

ineffective assistance of counsel) involve his contention that the alleged victim in his
underlying criminal case, Ms. Cooke, was incompetent to testify or, at the very least,
wholly unreliable, based upon her lack of memory of the events to which she testified at
Mr. Cooke's trial. (R., pp.49-50.) In support of this claim, Mr. Cooke proffered: (1) a
medical report showing that five months prior to Mr. Cooke's trial, Ms. Cooke sustained

severe brain injuries resulting in significant memory impairment and causing her to be
highly susceptible to false memories (R., pp.59-60); and (2) an affidavit from Ms. Cooke,
with an attached letter, which together discussed her current memory of the night in
question and asserted that, given the nature of her injuries and the fact that she does
not even remember the trial, she believes that she was in no shape to have testified
reliably against Mr. Cooke. (R., pp.54-59.)
In response, the State attacked the medical report and the affidavit as not being
contemporaneous with Ms. Cooke's trial testimony and, therefore, "not relevant," and it
asserted, without any evidentiary support, that, in fact, Ms. Cooke was competent to
testify at trial."

Ultimately, the district court relied on its memory of Ms. Cooke's

testimony to find that she was, in fact, competent when she testified against Mr. Cooke.
(R., p.86; Tr. Vol. II, p.10, Ls.9-17, p.16, Ls.11-18.) Thus, it concluded that Mr. Cooke
"has not carried his burden to show" that Ms. Cooke was incompetent or that her
testimony was unreliable. (R., p.86; Tr. Vol. 11, p.16, Ls.11-18.)
Mr. Cooke contends that the district court erred in at least three respects: (1) by
relying on its memory of Ms. Cooke's testimony; (2) by prematurely resolving the factual
question of whether Ms. Cooke was competent and gave reliable testimony; and (3)
apparently holding Mr. Cooke to the wrong standard by requiring him to prove that
Ms. Cooke was incompetent or unreliable prior to an evidentiary hearing.

l3As

should be clear from the above statement of facts, rather than putting a transcript or audio tape of
Ms. Cooke's testimony before the district court, or even asking the district court to take judicial notice of
such a transcript or tape, the prosecutor, Roger Bourne, spoke of Ms. Cooke's testimony based on his
memory and urged the district court to rely on its own memory. (R., pp.72-73; Tr. Vol. 11, p.3, L.8 - p.4,
L.4.)

1.

The District Court Erred Bv Relving On Its Memow Of Ms. Cooke's
Testimonv During Mr. Cooke's Underlvina Criminal Case

Although the district court surely could have considered a transcript or audio tape
of Ms. Cooke's trial testimony, the State never proffered such a transcript or tape and,
instead, actually requested that the district court to rely on its memory of the trial in
Mr. Cooke's underlying criminal case. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.3, L.8 - p.4, L.4.) Apparently, the
district court acceded to this request since it discussed the trial evidence fairly
extensively with Mr. Cooke's counsel (Tr. Vol. Ill p.9, L.23

- p.11,

L.19, p.13),I4 and

then went on to "take notice of the fact" that Ms. Cooke appeared competent to the
district court when she testified (R., p.86; Tr. Vol. Ill p.16, Ls.13-18), without citing to
any transcripts or audio tapes in the underlying case.
In Matthews v. State, 122 ldaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992), the ldaho Supreme
Court disapproved of just such a practice. In that case the petitioner alleged that he had
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 805-807, 839 P.2d at 1219-1221. In
summarily dismissing those claims, the district court took "judicial notice of the
proceedings which took place before it and determine[d] that the defendant received
competent representation at trial. The case was vigorously defended and the issues
appropriate for consideration were raised." Id. at 807, 839 P.2d at 1221. On appeal,
the ldaho Supreme Court vacated the district court's summary dismissal of the
petitioner's ineffective assistance claims, holding as follows:
The "record" relied upon by the district court consisted only of its "judicial
notice" of the trial proceedings over which, of course, the trial judge had
presided. However, there does not appear to be any statutory provision or
case law precedent which elevates the taking of judicial notices to the
-
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Notably, it is clear that Mr. Cooke's counsel had not actually read or heard that evidence since he had
to rely on what had been told to him about the trial from his client. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.9, Ls.23-25.)

equivalent level of a court record. On the latter, the court may base a sua
sponte dismissal, but not where a taking of judicial notice, by recollection
is relied upon.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 limits the scope of facts which may be
judicially noticed to those "not subject to reasonable dispute in that [they]
are either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." We are not
apprised that the facts surrounding the representation of petitioner at the
trial and on appeal are generally known in the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Facts may not be judicially noticed simply because they are within
the personal recollected knowledge of the judge, if those facts are not also
generally known in the jurisdiction.
Additionally, the facts attendant to the trial and in turn the appeal are not
capable of accurate and ready determination .... Judicial notice taken of
prior reported but not transcribed testimony cannot be allowed because
conclusions drawn from that source are incapable of being reviewed by an
appellate court.
[Wle hold that prior to dismissing a petition for post-conviction relief, the
district court is required to obtain that portion of the trial transcript as is
necessary to a determination "on the basis of the application, the answer
or motion, and the record," that there are no material issues of fact and
that the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief. In some case, no
transcript will be necessary because the petition may be deficient on its
face. In other cases, a partial transcript may be all that is required to
satisfy the statute.

Id. at 807-808, 839 P.2d at 1221-1222 (citations and footnotes omitted). This case is no
different. In this case, just as in Matthews, the district court took notice of what it had
observed while presiding over the petitioner's underlying criminal trial. Accordingly, a
similar result should obtain-the

district court's order of summary dismissal should be

vacated and Mr. Cooke's case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

The District Court Erred By Resolvinq Factual Issues At The Summary
Dismissal Stage

2.

Even if the district court was correct to have taken notice of its own memory of
the goings-on at Mr. Cooke's trial, its summary dismissal of Mr. Cooke's amended
petition still turned on: (a) its weighing of its recollection of that testimony against the
medical report, prepared five months before trial, indicating that Ms. Cooke's memory
was severely impaired and that she was highly susceptible to false memories, and
Ms. Cooke's subsequent statements about her memory of the incident in question, and
her belief that she was greatly impaired when she testified; and (b) its ultimate factual
determination that Ms. Cooke was competent when she testified. (R., p.86; Tr. Vol. II,
p.16, Ls.11-21.)
Mr. Cooke contends that this weighing of competing evidence to arrive at a
factual conclusion was contrary to the mandate of the UPCPA. As noted above, at the
summary dismissal stage, even controverted facts must be liberally construed and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the petitioner, and, if a genuine issue
of fact is raised, the district court must provide the petitioner with an evidentiary hearing.
Small, 132 ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. Thus, where Mr. Cooke proffered evidence
which, although not necessarily dispositive as to Ms. Cooke's state of memory at the
time of trial, certainly tended to indicate that Ms. Cooke's memory might have been
flawed at the time of her testimony such that she was not competent to give such
testimony,I5 he at least raised a genuine issue of material fact which required the district

-

l5A

--

-

witness may be deemed incompetent under I.R.E. 601 if she has no memory of the events in
question or if her memory is not genuine. See State v. Hall, 111 ldaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App.
1986).

court to have conducted an evidentiary hearing. See I.C. 5 19-4906(b), (c); Small, 132
ldaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155. Because the district court failed to provide such an
evidentiary hearing as required under the UPCPA, this Court should vacate the district
court's order of summary dismissal and remand Mr. Cooke's case for such a hearing.
3.

The District Court Erred B y Holding Mr. Cooke To The Incorrect Leaal
Standard

Although closely related to the argument presented in part I(A)(2)-that

the

district court was premature in seeking to weigh the evidence and find the facts
necessary to fully evaluate Mr. Cooke's amended petition-Mr.

Cooke argues

separately that the district court further erred by apparently applying the wrong legal
standard in dismissing his amended petition.

He contends that the district court

prematurely required him to prove that Ms. Cooke was incompetent, even though the
appropriate question at the summary dismissal stage is whether he has presented
evidence to raise a genuine issue as to whether Ms. Cooke was incompetent.

In its order granting the State's motion for summary dismissal, the district court
seemed to say that Mr. Cooke could only survive summary dismissal if his petition,
together with the record, proved his claims: "The Court is satisfied that Ms. Cooke was
competent to testify. The petitioner has not carried his burden to show that trial counsel
was ineffective in any respect regarding Ms. Cooke." (R., p.86.) To the extent that this
was the standard applied, the district court violated the UPCPA, which provides that
standard for summary dismissal is whether the petitioner has raised a genuine issue of
material fact.

Compare I.C.

5

19-4906(c) (articulating the standard for summary

dismissal) with Holmes v. State, 104 ldaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that the burden on the petitioner at an evidentiary hearing is to prove his allegations by

a preponderance of the evidence). Thus, to the extent that the district court applied the
wrong standard, this Court should vacate the order of dismissal and remand
Mr. Cooke's case for an evidentiary hearing.

B.

Mr. Cooke Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact Regarding His Trial
Counsel's Failure To Timely File A Notice Of Appeal And, Thus, Is Entitled To An
Evidentiarv Hearinq On The Claim Related To That lssue
The third claim in Mr. Cooke's amended petition was that his trial counsel

provided him with ineffective assistance for failing to timely file a notice of appeal, even
though he had specifically requested an appeal on the day he was sentenced.
(R., pp.50-51.)

However, the district court summarily dismissed this claim on two

grounds: first, the district court believed Mr. Cooke's trial counsel over Mr. Cooke and
found that Mr. Cooke had not timely requested that an appeal be filed (R., p.87); and
second, the district court found that because Mr. Cooke had not said what issue might
have been successfully appealed, Mr. Cooke would not have suffered any prejudice
even if his trial counsel had rendered a deficient performance by failing to file a notice of
appeal which had been timely requested. (R., p.87; Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.7-23.)
Mr. Cooke contends that both of the district court's conclusions were in error.
With regard to the district court's factual finding that, contrary to Mr. Cooke's verified
amended petition and sworn affidavit (R., p.50, 64-65), he had not, timely requested that
his attorney initiate an appeal, the district court's fact-finding was premature.

As

explained fully in Parts I(A)(2) and (3), above, the relevant inquiry at the summary
dismissal stage is whether the petitioner has presented evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact. If so, of course, the district court should not seek to
resolve that question of fact until after it has provided the petitioner with the statutorily

required evidentiary hearing. I.C. §§ 19-4906, -4907. In this case, Mr. Cooke's verified
petition and affidavit did raise such a question of fact. Because Mr. Cooke said one
thing and his trial counsel said another, there was a disputed question of fact which
necessitated an evidentiary hearing.
With regard to the district court's conclusion that Mr. Cooke's trial counsel could
not have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to timely file a notice of appeal
unless Mr. Cooke could prove that he would have prevailed on appeal, the district court
simply misapprehended the law. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), the
United States Supreme Court held that deficient performance results if "this particular
defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing,"
and that under such circumstances prejudice is presumed "with no further showing from
the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims." Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480,
483-484.
Because the district court's factual finding was premature and because the
district court's legal conclusion was incorrect as a matter of law, the district court erred
in summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's claim that his trial counsel failed to timely file a
notice of appeal as requested. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court's
summary dismissal order and remand Mr. Cooke's case for an evidentiary hearing.
C.

Mr. Cooke Raised A Genuine lssue Of Material Fact Regarding The Prison
Paraleqal's Refusal To Timely Notarize And Mail Mr. Cooke's Notice Of Appeal
And, Thus, Is Entitled To An Evidentiarv Hearing On The Claim Related To That
lssue
The fourth claim in Mr. Cooke's amended petition was that he was denied access

to the courts when the prison paralegal misadvised him of the date on which his notice
of appeal was due, and then proceeded to refuse to notarize or mail Mr. Cooke's pro se

notice of appeal.

(R., pp.50-51; 62-63.)

Although the State refuted the factual

allegations presented in Mr. Cooke's verified amended petition and his sworn affidavit
(R., p.74; Affidavit of Janel Gardner, pp.1-2; Tr. Vol. Ill p.4, L.17 - p.5, ~ . 5 ) , the
' ~ district
court never recognized the factual dispute and, in fact, never even ruled specifically on
this particular claim. (See generally R., pp.85-88 (district court's summary dismissal
order); Tr. Vol. II. (transcript of hearing on State's motion for summary dismissal).)
Because the district court never specifically addressed Mr. Cooke's fourth claim
for relief, but nevertheless denied Mr. Cooke's amended petition in its entirety, the
district court must be presumed to have dismissed that claim on the grounds set forth in
the State's responsive pleading." However, since the arguments proffered by the State
amount to nothing more than an attempt to rebut some of the evidence offered through
Mr. Cooke's verified amended petition and sworn affidavit, they demonstrate the
existence of a material question of fact which, as discussed at length above, may only
be resolved through an evidentiary hearing.
Because the district court's order of summary dismissal of this particular claim
apparently turned on the district court's premature weighing of evidence and resolving a
factual dispute, it was in error. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the district court's
summary dismissal order and remand Mr. Cooke's case for an evidentiary hearing.

l6AS discussed above in note 7, the State did not offer any evidence to refute Mr. Cooke's allegation that
the prison paralegal refused to notarize and mail his notice of appeal. The only argument that the State
offered as to this point was Mr. Bourne's personal opinion about the true facts: "I think that the defendant
went there late and then asked her to file certain things or mail certain things to the attorney, which she
did, and it-and it was too late." (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.2-5.)
l7Otherwise, the dismissal would be deemed to be a sua sponte dismissal under I.C. 5 19-4906(b) for
which the district court failed to give adequate prior notice. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 892
P.2d 488,493 (Ct. App. 1995).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Cooke respectfully requests that this Court vacate
the district court's order summarily dismissing Mr. Cooke's amended petition for postconviction relief, and that it remand his case for an evidentiary hearing as to all four of
his claims.
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